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ABSTRACT
Beware of IPs in Sheep’s Clothing: Measurement and Disclosure of IP
Spoofing Vulnerabilities
Alden Douglas Hilton
Department of Computer Science, BYU
Master of Science
Networks not employing destination-side source address validation (DSAV) expose
themselves to a class of pernicious attacks which could be prevented by filtering inbound traffic
purporting to originate from within the network. In this work, we survey the pervasiveness
of networks vulnerable to infiltration using spoofed addresses internal to the network. We
issue recursive Domain Name System (DNS) queries to a large set of known DNS servers
world-wide using various spoofed-source addresses. In late 2019, we found that 49% of the
autonomous systems we tested lacked DSAV. After a large-scale notification campaign run in
late 2020, we repeated our measurements in early 2021 and found that 44% of ASes lacked
DSAV—though importantly, as this is an observational study, we cannot conclude causality.
As case studies illustrating the dangers of a lack of DSAV, we measure susceptibility of DNS
resolvers to cache poisoning attacks and the NXNS attack, two attacks whose attack surface
is significantly reduced when DSAV in place. We discover 309K resolvers vulnerable to the
NXNS attack and 4K resolvers vulnerable to cache poisoning attacks, 70% and 59% of which
would have been protected had DSAV been in place.

Keywords: IP spoofing, DNS security, large-scale vulnerability disclosure, network
measurement
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Beware of IPs in Sheep’s Clothing: Measurement
and Disclosure of IP Spoofing Vulnerabilities
Alden Hilton, Joel Hirschmann, and Casey Deccio

2) An additional perspective exploring the effectiveness of
large-scale vulnerability disclosure.
3) Several case studies that illustrate how a lack of DSAV
could be exploited to discover vulnerabilities with otherwise inaccessible systems.
In late 2019, we surveyed 54K1 networks for DSAV, using
methodology that was effective in its detection, yet harmless.
We sent spoofed-source packets to these networks, each packet
having a source appearing to originate from the network for
which it was destined. We observed that about 49% of the
networks we surveyed lacked DSAV, allowing our spoofedsource packets into their network. In late 2020, we ran a largescale notification campaign to alert the administrators of the
vulnerable networks of our findings. Then in early 2021, we
repeated our analysis, this time surveying 61K networks. For
this second survey, we found that the fraction of networks
lacking DSAV was lower—approximately 44%. However, we
emphasize that as we did not design our notification campaign
as a controlled experiment, we cannot definitively attribute the
cause of this improvement.
Even more important than the fact that a network can be
infiltrated is the impact of the unauthorized access—how it
might be exploited to survey or compromise internal systems.
Thus, as case studies illustrating the importance of DSAV,
we measure susceptibility of recursive DNS resolvers to two
types of attacks: DNS cache poisoning and the NXNS attack,
a recently discovered denial-of-service vector [3]. With both
of these attacks, the only requirement for exploitation is that a
DNS query is received by the target as if from a trusted source.
The address the query response is returned to is irrelevant,
meaning an attacker is free to choose source addresses that are
potentially trusted by closed resolvers. DSAV can be used to
block these addresses and would prevent closed resolvers from
being abused in cache poisoning, NXNS, or other attacks with
similar requirements. We discover 399K resolvers vulnerable
to the NXNS attack, 70% of which would have been protected
had DSAV been in place. We also identify nearly 4,000 DNS
servers that were vulnerable to cache poisoning attack, 59%
of which would have been protected had DSAV been in place.

Abstract—Networks not employing destination-side source
address validation (DSAV) expose themselves to a class of
pernicious attacks which could be prevented by filtering
inbound traffic purporting to originate from within the network.
In this work, we survey the pervasiveness of networks vulnerable
to infiltration using spoofed addresses internal to the network.
We issue recursive Domain Name System (DNS) queries to
a large set of known DNS servers world-wide using various
spoofed-source addresses. In late 2019, we found that 49%
of the autonomous systems we tested lacked DSAV. After a
large-scale notification campaign run in late 2020, we repeated
our measurements in early 2021 and found that 44% of ASes
lacked DSAV—though importantly, as this is an observational
study, we cannot conclude causality. As case studies illustrating
the dangers of a lack of DSAV, we measure susceptibility of
DNS resolvers to cache poisoning attacks and the NXNS attack,
two attacks whose attack surface is significantly reduced when
DSAV in place. We discover 309K resolvers vulnerable to the
NXNS attack and 4K resolvers vulnerable to cache poisoning
attacks, 70% and 59% of which would have been protected had
DSAV been in place.

I. I NTRODUCTION

S

POOFED Internet traffic is an unfortunate reality of
today’s world—and will likely continue to be until all
networks block spoofed traffic from leaving their networks
(see section II-A). Spoofed traffic facilitates attacks such as the
largest-recorded distributed denial-of-service attack to date—
the 2.3 Tbps attack reportedly mitigated by Amazon Web
Services in early 2020 [1]. Furthermore, spoofing enables
access to protected network resources that rely on IP-based
controls, such as closed DNS resolvers. We show that such
access could allow remote attackers to discover vulnerabilities
with otherwise inaccessible systems. Fortunately, while not all
spoofed traffic can be reliably identified and blocked once it
reaches its destination network, some of it can—a practice we
refer to as destination-side source address validation, or DSAV.
This practice protects controlled network resources and lowers
their potential for use in distributed denial of service attacks.
While the effects of spoofing can be mitigated in some cases
with protocols that include some form of identity check (e.g.,
TCP), in other cases, this infiltration creates a vulnerability
that can be exploited for surveillance or compromise.
This paper has three main contributions:

II. BACKGROUND
A. Spoofing prevention techniques

1) A longitudinal, large-scale study of the deployment of
DSAV.

There are two sides to spoofing prevention, which we
refer to as origin-side source address validation (OSAV) and

Alden Hilton is a graduate student and Joel Hirshmann an undergraduate student at Brigham Young University (emails: aldenhilton@byu.edu,
jhirschm@byu.edu). Casey Deccio is an assistant professor of computer
science at Brigham Young University (email: casey@byu.edu).

1 In the conference paper this work is based off of [2], we listed this number
as 62K. In that paper, we considered IPv4 and IPv6 networks separately; in
this work, we simply aggregate the data by autonomous system number.
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destination-side source address validation (DSAV). OSAV
deals with preventing spoofed traffic from leaving its network
of origin; DSAV deals with preventing it from entering its
destination network.
Best Current Practice (BCP) 38 [4], proposed as a mechanism to prevent denial-of-service attacks that rely on IP
address spoofing, is the primary mechanism for performing
OSAV. The basic idea is for routers to restrict traffic originating from their networks to the address space allocated
for them, thus preventing spoofed traffic from even leaving
its network of origin. This practice prevents networks from
become an “unwitting source of an attack [4].” However, it
is important to note that it does not protect the networks
employing it from attack; if even one network lacking OSAV
exists, traffic with spoofed IP addresses will continue to be a
threat.
Spoofed traffic is more difficult to identify once it reaches
its destination network—at that point, no path history is
known, including its origin. Nonetheless, while not all spoofed
traffic can be identified and filtered, some of it can, such as
traffic from special purpose IP addresses [5] and the prefixes
announced by the destination network itself. There are several
mechanisms for accomplishing this, outlined in BCP 84 [6],
[7], including access control lists (ACLs) and unicast Reverse
Path Forwarding (uRPF). ACLs are manually maintained lists
of addresses that are acceptable (or alternatively, unacceptable)
and should be allowed (or blocked). ACLs, though perhaps the
easiest to conceptualize, can be difficult, or even infeasible, to
maintain at scale.
There are several variants of uRPF, each with their own
set of tradeoffs, described in [7]. Strict uRPF means to only
accept a packet if a route from the destination back to the
source exists and the path back to the source would use the
same interface the packet was received on. Strict uRPF is
often avoided, as it will drop legitimate traffic in the case of
asymmetric routing. Loose uRPF only considers the first of the
two conditions listed above: that a route from destination back
to the source exists. Loose uRPF is seen as “not desirable” [7],
as it may miss a significant portion of spoofed traffic, though
it does not have the false-positive problem of strict uRPF.
Loose uRPF partially satisfies our tests (see section IV-A2),
blocking traffic from special use addresses [5], but may not
be sufficient to block traffic appearing to originate from one’s
own prefixes. There are variants of uRPF that attempt to strike
a balance between strict and loose, the latest being Enhanced
Feasible-Path uRPF, or EFP-uRPF. EFP-uRPF specifies that if
the path back to the source uses an interface that would be used
for at least one of the prefixes announced by the originating
autonomous system—regardless of whether the source address
is in that specific prefix—the packet is accepted.
The choice of specific technique for performing DSAV is
very dependent on the network configuration; there is no onesize-fits-all. One case in particular represents an open problem
for which no ideal DSAV solution exists. Specifically, some
networks operate multiple “island” networks under the same
autonomous system number, with no means of communicating
with each other other than across the Internet at large. In this
case, the AS must allow incoming traffic from its own prefixes;

otherwise, the islands would not be able to communicate
with each other. Although this scenario represents a legitimate
reason for an autonomous system to accept its own prefixes,
it nonetheless leaves open the door for spoofed traffic to enter
the network. One possible solution is to split the islands into
separate autonomous systems, though there is considerable
overhead to doing so. For the purpose of this analysis, we
consider networks such as this as vulnerable to spoofing
attacks.
B. The Domain Name System
The domain name system (DNS) is responsible for translating human-readable domain names to the IP addresses of
the servers hosting those domains (e.g., example.com 
192.0.2.10). The DNS is organized hierarchically into zones.
Queries for names within a given zone are directed to servers
authoritative for that zone, which provide the name-to-IPaddress mapping, if there is one. Zone administrators can
delegate portions of their namespace, such that they form
“children” zones, hosted by other authoritative servers. When
a nameserver receives a query for a name in the delegated
namespace, it returns one or more NS records, one for
each nameserver that is authoritative for the delegated space.
Recursive resolvers are servers responsible for navigating
this hierarchical namespace; they receive queries from clients
and issuing queries to the appropriate authoritative servers—
following the NS records—resolving domain names on behalf
of end users.
NS delegations come in the form of domain names, such
as ns1.example.com. When these names themselves are
subdomains of the delegated namespace, then the authoritative
servers include in their referral response the IP addresses of
the nameservers, known as glue records.
If the glue records are not included, the recursive resolver
must initiate a new resolution process to resolve the IP
address(es) of the nameserver(s) before it can carry on with the
original query. Frequently, multiple nameservers exist for the
same zone, e.g., to provide redundancy and extra resilience.
In early 2020, Afek et al. [3] disclosed the NXNS attack,
an attack technique that exploits this aspect of the DNS.
Prior to their disclosure, many DNS resolver implementations
would proactively resolve all NS addresses, even though in
theory only 1 is needed. In typical cases, this is not an issue.
However, an attacker can exploit this by configuring a zone
with as many NS records as possible without including any
glue records; in practice, Afek et al. [3] found this number
to be 135. Because of factors such a resolvers attempting to
obtain both the IPv4 and IPv6 addresses of each NS record
in the referral, authoritative servers using DNSSSEC to prove
the nonexistence of those records, and TCP control packets,
the inclusion of 135 fake NS records allows an attacker to
force a resolver and an authoritative server of his/her choice
to exchange 3,240 packets, degrading the performance of
both the recursive resolver and authoritative server. Thus, the
NXNS attack allows attackers to achieve an application factor
of 1,620 (in terms of packets sent). Afek et al. [3] outline
several variants of the attack which collectively can be used
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to overwhelm both recursive resolvers and authoritative servers
alike. Patches have been released for most major DNS resolver
implementations including BIND, Unbound, Knot Resolver,
and PowerDNS Recursor [8]–[11]. The basic idea behind these
patches is to limit the number of NS records resolved to a
reasonable amount (e.g., 5). Notably, Microsoft did not release
a patch for Windows DNS [12].
In this work, we also consider a second attack on the DNS,
known as cache poisoning. In this attack, would-be cache
poisoners impersonate authoritative servers and force recursive
resolvers to accept false IP-to-name mappings, facilitating
man-in-the-middle attacks. One of the most salient cache
poisoning techniques was disclosed in 2008 [13]. The primary
defense against this attack is source port randomization, a
practice now considered standard [14].
While both of these attacks can be prevented by applying
the appropriate patches and configurations to the resolvers,
DSAV can be used to drastically reduce the attack surface of
vulnerable resolvers. Best practice is to “close” DNS resolvers,
or configure them to accept queries from only a trusted set of
clients, such as clients from resolvers’ own networks [15].
Both of these attacks depend on an attacker’s ability to query
the resolvers targeted, closed resolvers are more difficult to
reach, if the networks hosting the resolvers employ DSAV.
If the networks lack DSAV, the attackers are able to spoof
addresses from within the same network as the resolvers and
bypass the IP-based access control. Thus, in this work, we
consider both vulnerability at the resolver-level as well as
vulnerability at the network-level.

objectives focused on exploring the variety of ways in which a
lack of DSAV might be discovered. Our methodology differs
primarily in that 1) we use several diverse, spoofed-source
IP addresses for each destination, rather than only the next
sequential IP address; 2) the selection of target IP addresses
used in our research consist of those that generate query
activity at the root servers; and 3) our study includes both
IPv4 and IPv6. Our results show that there are advantages to
both the current methodology and that used by Korczyński, et
al. In particular, the sheer breadth of the IPv4 address space
scanned by Korczyński, et al., resulted in more overall hits
than our targeted approach. The diversity of spoofed sources
used in our experiment uncovered resolvers—and ASes—that
would not have otherwise been identified using only a sameprefix source. Nonetheless, the overall percentage of measured
ASes with reachable IPv4 targets is consistent between the
two studies, within 1%: 48.78% vs. 49.34%. Finally, in the
current paper, we extend our analysis to survey and identify
vulnerabilities of internal systems, as case studies of our
methodology.
B. Notifications
There is a growing body of literature addressing the issue
of carrying out effective large-scale vulnerability notifications.
Many different challenges have been highlighted, such as
finding the best communication channel, finding the correct
points of contact, and establishing trust in the notification
itself.
Communication channels that have been explored include
emails directed to contacts found through Whois [19]–[27],
emails directed to default email addresses [19], [21], [22], [25],
[26], and notifications disseminated through regional CERTs
[22], [24], [28]. Note that this list of communication channels
is not comprehensive; other methods have been used but aren’t
listed here as they are application-specific and don’t fit our use
case (e.g., notifications sent through Google Search Console
[27]). Of these options, emailing Whois addresses appears to
be most effective. This is according to Li et al. who show
that directly contacting resource owners is more effective than
contacting regional CERTs [24] and Cetin et al. [25] found
that over 80% of emails to default addresses bounce.
Many different variables have been explored for establishing
trust in emails, such as the level of detail included, the email
format (e.g., HTML vs plain-text), and the apparent reputation
of the sender’s address. We detail some relevant findings
from these studies in sections VII-A2 and VII-A3, where we
describe our notification design.
The general consensus of all these studies is that largescale notifications have a modest, yet statistically significant
effect of remediation. Given this finding, it is the hope that
with further research into notification design, this effectiveness
can be increased. In this study, we explore one dimension
of notification design that as far as we are aware, has yet
to be explored—that of emailing multiple points of contact
per organization. Doing so increases the chances of the email
being received, but at the same time, increases the potential
burden on the recipients.

III. R ELATED W ORK
A. Source Address Validation
The most prominent example of research relating to the
employment of BCP 38 is that of the Spoofer Project [16]. The
Spoofer Project employs custom build software that volunteers
install in their network. This software attempts to send spoofed
packets out of the network directed to servers run by the
project. If these packets reach the servers, the project is able
to infer that BCP 38 is not in place on the host’s network.
Researchers recently reported that at least a quarter of the
autonomous systems tested do not prevent spoofed traffic from
leaving their networks [17].
The Spoofer Project is also able to test for DSAV, though
in a very limited sense. If the custom software is installed on
a machine with an Internet facing address (i.e., not behind
a NAT), the project can direct spoofed traffic towards the
clients and determine if it arrives at the host. However, the
requirement to not be installed behind a NAT severely limits
the scope of the results pertaining to DSAV. That said, in
2019, the researchers reported that at least two thirds of the
autonomous systems (ASes) tested did not employ DSAV [17].
In work performed concurrently with (and independently
of) our late-2019 measurement, Korczyński, et al. [18], tested
networks for source address validation using a methodology
similar to ours. They issued queries to every IP address in
the IPv4 space, in each case spoofing the source IP address
just higher than the selected destination. In contrast, our
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C. NXNS Attack
As far as we are aware, only one study has looked at this
vulnerability [3]; no follow-up work has been completed to
date. In their work, they outlined the threat model and detailed
tests performed to validate the model. In contrast, in our study,
we measure the prevalence of resolvers still vulnerable to the
attack roughly a year after its disclosure.

Same-prefix: a random IP address from the same /24
(IPv4) or /64 (IPv6) prefix as the target.
• Destination-as-source: The destination IP address itself.
• Bogon addresses: Addresses from reserved address space
(e.g., [5]). The specific addresses used are listed later in
this section.
The Same-ASN addresses and the Bogon addresses together
form a pool of addresses that are used for each destination
in the autonomous system. When generating source addresses
for each autonomous system, we considered IPv4 and IPv6
separately. For example, if a given AS had both IPv4 and IPv6
addresses in the DITL, two separate pools would be generated,
one with IPv4 addresses and the other with IPv6 addresses.
The method for generating the Same-ASN addresses varies
slightly between the two measurements. For Round1, to
generate the IPv4 addresses, we divided all the IP address
space originating from an AS into 24-bit prefixes. From each
/24 prefix, we selected, at random, a single IP address. In
both cases, the first and the last IP addresses were excluded
from selection because of their reserved status in a /24 subnet.
The resulting IP addresses formed the set of other-prefix
addresses for any target IP address announced by that AS.
Because some ASes had a prohibitively large number of /24
prefixes, we limited our selection to 97 prefixes2 . For the IPv6
addresses, we used a more targeted methodology to identify
more realistic client addresses, rather than blindly probing the
sparsely-populated IPv6 address space. The addresses were
drawn at random from the /64s of addresses observed in an
IPv6 hit list [31]. One address per /64 was selected, limiting
the selection to the first 100 addresses within the /64, excluding
the first two. If more than 97 /64s were present in the hit list, a
random sample was selected. This means that for autonomous
systems not present in the hit list, no Same-ASN addresses
were generated, a limitation that affected roughly 15% of
the ASes with IPv6 address space. We had thought we had
accounted for these cases, but due to an error in our code, this
limitation was not corrected until Round2.
For Round2, 20 Same-ASN addresses were generated for
each autonomous system. Notably, this is significantly less
than the first experiment, where up to 97 addresses were
generated for each. We lowered the number of addresses used
to reduce the traffic generated as a result of the experiment
and to facilitate a shorter experiment duration (see IV-A5).
To generate the Same-ASN IPv4 addresses, addresses were
selected at random from the entire space announced by the
AS. For the IPv6 addresses, the Same-ASN addresses were
first drawn at random from the /64s of addresses observed in
an IPv6 hit list [31]. One address per /64 was selected (again,
limiting the selection to the first 100 addresses in the /64,
excluding the first two). If more than 20 /64s were present
in the hit list, a random sample was selected. If less than
20 /64s were present, the remaining addresses were drawn at
random from the entire space announced by the AS. This was
•

IV. M EASUREMENT M ETHODOLOGY
A high-level outline of our experiment is as follows:
• December 2019: Round 1 DSAV and source port randomization measurements
• October 2020: Email notifications
• March 2021: Round 2 DSAV, source port randomization,
and NXNS measurements
The methodology for carrying out the two measurements is
described in the remainder of this section. The methodology
for the notification campaign is described in section VII.
A. DSAV
We ran two experiments testing for DSAV: the first between
November and December 2019 and the second in March 2021.
We will refer to the first as Round1 and the second as
Round2. The basic method for detecting a lack of DSAV
is the same for both experiments. We sent DNS queries with
spoofed source addresses to known DNS resolvers worldwide.
Each resolver was sent unique, dynamically-generated queries
for domains under our control; as such, if we observed a
corresponding query at our authoritative server, we were able
to determine that our spoofed queries successfully infiltrated
the network.
1) DNS Servers (Targets): For both experiments, the set
of resolvers measured were found in the “Day in the Life”
collection sponsored by the DNS Operations, Analysis, and
Research Center (OARC) [29]. The DITL consists of traffic
collected at participating root servers over a 48-hour period. As
in general, at some point in the resolution process, all resolvers
must query the root servers, the DITL provides a rich, highlyrepresentative set of recursive resolvers. Round1 used DITL
data collected in April 2019; Round2 used data collected
May 2020. The Round1 data set consists of 11,204,889
IPv4 addresses and 784,777 IPv6 addresses, corresponding to
54,185 autonomous systems. The Round2 data set consists of
15,646,911 IPv4 addresses and 1,569,667 IPv6 addresses, corresponding to 60,618 autonomous systems. 4,371,182 (36%)
IP addresses and 49,854 (92%) ASes present in Round1 were
also present in Round2. Previous research has shown that
there is churn in IP addresses of DNS resolvers—specifically,
open resolvers—over time [30]; thus, it is unsurprising that
only 36% of the resolvers from Round1 were still present in
Round2.
2) Spoofed Sources: Each destination received several
queries, enumerating the different type of source addresses
that should be blocked at the network border. The following
categories of spoofed sources were used:
• Same-ASN: randomly selected IP addresses from prefixes
advertised by the same autonomous system (as the target).

2 The number 97 was chosen when we had three other spoofed-source
categories in mind, such that the maximum number of source IP addresses
we would use for a given target would be an even 100. However, we ended
up adding another source IP address to our experiment, such that at most 101
sources would be used to query a given target.
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done by dividing the space in /64 prefixes, selecting /64s at
random, selecting random addresses from the /64s (limiting
the selection within the /64s to the first 100 addresses in the
/64, excluding the first two), and repeating the process until
the 20 address had been selected.
Note that for both rounds, this methodology does not
guarantee that the Same-ASN addresses will not be in the
same /24 or /64 of any of the destination addresses. However,
when processing the results, for any given successful sourcedestination pair, if the source and destination are both within
the same /24 or /64, we classify the resulting hit as Sameprefix.
We also generate a random Same-prefix address on a perdestination basis. For each destination IPv4 address, we select
an address within its /24, excluding the first and last addresses.
For the Round1 IPv6 addresses, we selected addresses within
the first 100 addresses of its /64, excluding the first two
addresses. For the Round2 IPv6 addresses, we expanded the
selection to include the first 200 addresses of the /64, again
excluding the first two addresses. The Same-prefix queries
guaranteed that each destination received at least one query
appearing to be from the same /24 or /64 as itself.
The bogon addresses used vary slightly between the two experiments. For Round1 IPv4 addresses, we used 192.168.0.10
(private) and 127.0.0.1 (loopback). For the IPv6 addresses, we
used fc00::10 (unique local) and ::1 (loopback). For Round2,
we used these same addresses with just one exception, substituting fd00::10 for fc00::10. The use of fc00::100 for
Round1 was a mistake, albeit a mild one. Though it does
represent a “valid” bogon address—falling under undefined
space—it lacks the L-bit (i.e., locally allocated) and is not
what we had intended, hence the substitution of fd00::10 for
Round2. Additionally, we added 192.0.2.10 and 2001:db8::10
(documentation) for Round2.
In summary, for Round1, each destination received queries
from up to 101 addresses: 97 Same-ASN, 2 Bogon addresses,
the Same-prefix query, and the Destination-as-source query.
For Round2, each destination received queries from up to 25
addresses: 20 Same-ASN, 3 Bogon addresses, the Same-prefix
query, and the Destination-as-source query.
Autonomous system lookups for the 2019 dataset were
performed using the RIPEstat API. For the second experiment,
we transitioned to using the Routeviews prefix to AS mappings
dataset published by CAIDA [32] as it provided a more
efficient way of performing the lookups.
3) Query Names: For both experiments, we encoded the
spoofed source, the query destination, and a timestamp into
the qname requested. This encoding scheme ensured the
uniqueness of each query as well as allowed us to determine definitively which spoofed source addresses reach
their target destinations. We encoded the query names used
in our experiment according to the following template:
ts.src.dst.kw.dns-lab.org, where ts is the timestamp
the query was sent, src is the spoofed-source IP address, dst
is the target IP address, and kw is a keyword associated with
the current experiment.
For Round1, we configured our servers to return
NXDOMAIN for all queries associated with the experiment.

This was an oversight which caused us to miss queries
from resolvers configured to use QNAME minimization (see
section V-B). We corrected this oversight for the Round2 by
configuring our authoritative server to return NOERROR for all
queries under the domain used for the experiment.
4) Follow-Up Queries: For both experiments, a process
monitored traffic at our authoritative servers. This process
would initiate a set of follow-up queries in real time the
first—and only the first—time a query associated with a given
destination address arrived at our servers. The follow queries
included:
• IPv4- and IPv6-only: two sets of 10 queries that elicited
queries over IPv4 and IPv6, respectively.
• Open resolver: non-spoofed-source query.
• TCP: a query that elicited an additional query over TCP
to our servers.
The IPv4- and IPv6-only queries were elicited by using query
names in DNS domains that were only delegated to IPv4
addresses or IPv6 addresses, respectively. The TCP query was
elicited by issuing a query for which the authoritative server
would always respond with the truncation (TC) bit set. A
truncated response causes the recursive resolver to issue its
query again over TCP [33].
For the second experiment, we added a query that tested for
susceptibility to the NXNS attack. For details on this follow-up
test, see section IV-B.
5) Query Execution: The second experiment was completed much faster than the first. We intended to complete
Round1 in 4 weeks, though it actually took 7 due to unexpected interruptions (such as a power outage). We designed
Round2 to require a week to complete. This quicker run
time was made possible by lowering the number of spoofed
sources per destination. Round1 ran from November 6 and
December 27, 2019. Round2 ran from March 11 to March
19, 2021. Both measurements were initiated from a network
that lacked OSAV (BCP 38 [4]). The absence of OSAV in
our client’s network was a requirement for effectively testing
DSAV. For both measurements, we engineered it such that the
initial queries destined for each target address were distributed
uniformly throughout the entire week, easing any potential
burden our experiment might have posed on any one address.
B. NXNS Measurement
We next engineered a custom authoritative server that synthesised NS records based on the destination address that was
encoded into the query, allowing us to track how many NS
records each resolver requested. We configured this server to
return 20 NS records. We validated this server’s ability to
identify unpatched resolvers by installing multiple versions
of common DNS resolver implementations; for each implementation we install one version that was released prior to
the NXNS attack disclosure and one version that was released
afterwards. The objective here was to observe in a controlled
environment how each resolver implementation responds to
the NXNS attack. Specifically, we installed the following safe
resolvers: BIND 9.16.8, Unbound 1.12.0, Knot Resolver 5.2.0,
and PDNS Recursor 4.3.1; we also installed the following
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vulnerable resolvers: BIND 9.12.1; Unbound 1.9.4, Windows
DNS on Windows Server 2019, Knot Resolver 5.1.0, and
PDNS Recursor 4.3.0. Note that we only tested one version
of Windows DNS as Windows did not release a patch for this
attack [12].
We then tested these resolvers with our custom server. Of
the safe resolvers: BIND requested the NS records in sets of
5, requesting both the A and AAAA records simultaneously (a
total of 10 records). Unbound requested a random subset of
12 of the 40 possible A/AAAA records. Knot resolver had the
same behavior as BIND. PDNS recursor requested 5 records
at a time—and only the A records. Of the vulnerable resolvers,
BIND, Unbound, and Knot requested all 40 A/AAAA records
simultaneously. Windows DNS and PDNS recursor requested
all 20 A records simultaneously, but did not request the AAAA
records. Note that all resolvers were installed and tested on
a machine without IPv6 connectivity. With these tests, we
verified that it is possible to observe susceptibility to the
NXNS attack from an authoritative server’s perspective.
The test is relatively harmless; at most, 40 queries need
to be requested, a nominal amount. The zone used for the
experiment is not configured with DNSSEC, which plays a
large role in the theoretical amplification factor of the NXNS
attack. This configuration, combined with the relatively low
number of NS records returned, results in our test only eliciting
roughly 1% of the number of queries that theoretically could
be elicited by the NXNS attack.

(i.e., ts.src.dst.kw.dns-lab.org), a resolver using
QNAME minimization would ask for kw.dns-lab.org, then
dst.kw.dns-lab.org, etc. For Round1, our authoritative
servers returned an NXDOMAIN response code in response
to any queries related to our experiment. For at least some
resolver implementations that implement QNAME minimization, an NXDOMAIN response halts further queries associated
with the QNAME. This is because an NXDOMAIN for a given
domain name implies that no subdomains (i.e., with additional
labels on the left) exist [36].
For Round1, we observed QNAME-minimized queries
from 17,981 (0.16%) of the IP addresses that we targeted
with our initial reachability query. For 9,898 (55%) of these IP
addresses, we never received a query with the full QNAME.
Most notably, they did not include the label with the encoded source address. With no way to identify the source
IP address that we used to reach these 9,898 targets, we
excluded them from the total number of reachable targets.
Nonetheless, we still learned something about the networks
from which the QNAME-minimized queries originated. We
observed that DNS clients from 2,081 ASNs queried for
kw.dns-lab.org (the product of QNAME minimization). Of
those, 2,041 (98%) were identified as lacking DSAV, in that
we observed queries from these same QNAME-minimizing
resolvers or from other (i.e., non-QNAME-minimizing) resolvers. Thus, QNAME minimization did not diminish our
DSAV measurement results. Nonetheless, we corrected this
oversight for Round2 by returning a NOERROR response code
for all qnames under the experimental domain.

V. M ETHODOLOGY C ONSIDERATIONS
Several issues merit our discussion, including the comprehensiveness of our data, QNAME minimization, and potential
human intervention.

C. Human Intervention
To account for potential false positives due to human intervention (e.g., curious analysts resolving the qnames manually),
we only considered queries from resolvers that responded to
the initial query within 10 seconds of when we sent it. For
Round1, queries for an additional 3,444 IPv4 addresses and
70 IPv6 addresses had a life-time that exceeded our threshold,
representing less than 0.1% of addresses, for both protocols.
These addresses correspond to 433 ASes; for all but 19 of
these, we were able to infer the lack of DSAV through the
presence of other resolvers which did query our servers within
the 10 second window. For Round2, 2,595 IPv4 and 85 IPv6
addresses were excluded by this filter, corresponding to 509
ASes. For all but 25 of these, we were able to infer lack of
DSAV through the presence of other resolvers.

A. Comprehensiveness
DITL data is generally considered representative and has
been used in numerous studies. However, it should not be
considered to be comprehensive. It is possible that some
resolvers did not need to query the root during the collection
period, either because they relied on cached records or due
to local instances of the root zone [34]. Additionally, it is
likely that IP addresses that did represent resolvers at the
time of the DITL capture no longer did at the time of our
measurements (e.g., due to IP churn). As an alternative to
using the DITL, we could have conducted an Internet-wide,
comprehensive scan, similar to the work of [18]. However, we
elected to use the DITL to avoid the volume of traffic required
for a comprehensive scan. Additionally, a comprehensive scan
of the IPv6 address space is not feasible. We consider the
DITL sufficiently representative for our purposes.

D. Experimental Design
Because we did not design our notification campaign as a
controlled experiment (e.g., with randomly assigned treatment
groups), we cannot definitively attribute the cause for any
differences we observe in the two measurement experiments.
Due to time constraints near the time of notification delivery,
designing a controlled experiment was not possible. Our
priority was delivering the notifications without further delay.
Additionally, the slight differences in methodology between
the two measurements further complicate determining the
exact cause for any differences in results. Regardless, there still

B. QNAME Minimization
In an effort to preserve privacy, some modern DNS resolvers avoid sending authoritative servers the full query
name (QNAME) and instead only ask for the next unknown
label. This is known as QNAME Minimization [35]. In the
case of our experiment, before asking for the full QNAME
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is much to be learned by analyzing the differences between
the two datasets.

of four per day—plus a one-time series of fewer than 30
follow-up queries—the impact of our experiment would have
been barely, if at all, noticeable. As one of these followup queries was designed to elicit further queries to explore
susceptibility to the NXNS attack, the exact number of queries
required to resolve the follow-up queries varied on the resolver
configuration. In the worst case (i.e., a vulnerable resolver),
an additional 40 queries are required—still a nominal volume
of queries. Second, the SOA (start of authority) record of the
DNS zone corresponding to our query names (see subsubsection IV-A3) included: 1) a RNAME (responsible name) field
with an email address with which we could be contacted,
e.g., for more information or to opt out; and 2) an MNAME
(master server name) field with the domain name of a Web
server providing a brief description of this project. The project
description included contact and opt-out information. The
system from which the queries with non-spoofed sources were
sent (see subsubsection IV-A4) also ran a Web server with the
same project information.
Our notifications undoubtedly resulted in added load for
the administrators that received them. Not even considering
the effort required to actually address the vulnerability itself,
the mere presence of unsolicited emails in one’s inbox can be
taxing. Further exacerbating this issue, some of the responses
we received indicated that at least in some cases, the admin
was forwarded the same notification multiple times from the
other recipients of the notification. While this added load is
unfortunate, we ultimately felt the potential good that could be
accomplished through the notifications outweighed this cost.
We took some efforts to mitigate this cost, such as excluding
addresses from our communications that appeared as points of
contact for too many organizations. Additionally, our emails
clearly indicated who we were and provided instructions
on how to stop receiving further communications from us.
Reactions to our emails were mixed, but ultimately the positive
reactions outweigh the negative ones (see section VII-B2).

E. Ethical Considerations
The measurement of network and systems vulnerabilities
requires care, both in the activity itself and in the disclosure of the findings. Because of the nature of our research,
we consulted various resources for ethical guidance. As our
measurement studies did not contain any human elements,
we did not consult our institution’s IRB for that portion of
our work. However, the notification campaign introduced a
human element. Thus, prior to delivering the notifications,
we consulted two members of the IRB. It was determined
that our work did not constitute human subjects research,
and as such, was outside of the IRB’s domain. Additionally,
we consulted with individuals from the legal department, the
office of research and creative activities, and our own computer
science department with respect to the ethics of our research.
We likewise reviewed the Menlo Report [37], which holds
some of the key guidelines for ethical research in this area. Of
the ethics principles outlined in the Menlo Report, those most
applicable to our current research are 1) justice, 2) respect for
law and public interest, and 3) beneficence.
Regarding justice, our measurements considered all target
IP addresses (i.e., from the DITL data) equally; no particular
industry, geography, nation state, address space, or protocol
was deliberately targeted more than another.
Perhaps the biggest ethical question associated with our
research was the legality of measuring another’s network
using our methodology. Our measurements crossed interstate
boundaries world-wide, each potentially with their own laws
regarding unauthorized network access. For example, the
United States (U.S.) outlaws any intentional access of nonpublic, government-owned computer systems, without authorization [38]. We cannot definitively determine whether or not
the systems that we measured are non-public nor whether
our benign packets even constitute a violation of this statute.
In any case, we believe that our methodology is justified
because of the benefit it brings in the public interest. Indeed
the Menlo Report’s principle of beneficence suggests that the
benefits of an experiment should be maximized and the harms
minimized. Bringing to light the severity and pervasiveness of
the lack of DSAV and the potential for network penetration
is extremely valuable to the Internet community. We expect
that responsibly publishing our findings will be a catalyst in
spreading awareness and taking the necessary action to fill the
security gaps identified herein.
The potential harms associated with our experiment might
include degradation of service due to our traffic, time spent
following up on alerts from Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS),
or careless vulnerability disclosure. We took several measures
to minimize any negative impact, and even the appearance
of abuse. First, we limited both the number and the rate of
queries directed towards any given destination, as described
in subsubsection IV-A5. Considering query rates at production
DNS servers are typically measured in queries per second,
and our maximum per-destination rate was on the order

VI. DSAV E XPERIMENT R ESULTS
The pervasive lack of DSAV well exceeded our expectations. For Round1, of the 11,204,889 IPv4 addresses targeted with our experiment, at least 519,447 (4.6%) received
and handled one or more of our queries, as indicated by a
recursive-to-authoritative query observed at our authoritative
DNS servers. Similarly, of the 784,777 IPv6 addresses we
targeted, 49,008 (6.2%) recursively handled at least one of
our spoofed-source queries. While the figures for target IP
addresses are nominal, the number of ASes with affected IP
addresses was far more pervasive: 26,695 (49%) of the ASes
were vulnerable to infiltration via spoofed-source packets.
These numbers represent the lower bound of networks that
do not support DSAV.
As for Round2, we found 26,488 networks lacking DSAV
(44%). 436,781 IPv4 addresses (2.8%) and 261,105 IPv6
addresses (16.6%) were reachable. Encouragingly, the percentage of vulnerable networks is somewhat smaller than
that of Round1. Similarly, the percentage of IPv4 addresses
reachable is lower in the second round. Surprisingly, the
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Fig. 1: Distribution of ASes according to (a) number of
neighbors and (b) number of prefixes announced. Each bar
is subdivided by the number of ASes with or without DSAV.
The blue dashed line shows the percentage of each bar that
lack DSAV and corresponds to the blue y-scale on the right.

TABLE I: DSAV results for the 10 countries associated with
the largest number of ASes.
percentage of reachable IPv6 addresses is considerably higher
the second time. As discussed in section VI-C, the increase
in IPv6 addresses reached can largely be attributed to a single
autonomous system with over 200K reachable IPv6 addresses.
This finding illustrates that as a large portion of DSAV is
performed at the autonomous-system-level, results at the IPlevel can be volatile—merely a property of the autonomous
systems lacking DSAV.
Table I shows our results broken down by country. The top
10 countries with the most autonomous systems are shown. IPto-country lookups were done using the MaxMind GeoLite2
Country database. Each autonomous system was associated
with one or more countries based on the countries listed
for its constituent IP addresses. Both data sets included over
twice as many United States (US)-based ASes than the next
most represented country, Brazil. Nevertheless, the diversity
of percentage of ASNs lacking DSAV (i.e., “reachable”) is
apparent, with the US being below average and Brazil, Russia,
and Ukraine showing that over half of ASes lack DSAV.
Notably, for all 10 countries, the percentage of reachable ASes
decreased in Round2.
Only considering the autonomous systems that were present
for both measurements, in Round1, 51% (25,511 out of
49,854) lacked DSAV. By the same criteria, in Round2, 48%
(24,137) lacked DSAV. Using a two sample z-test of proportions, we see that the decrease is significant (𝑝 < 0.00001).
Oddly, 2,410 (9.9%) of the ASes that were not vulnerable in
Round1 were vulnerable in Round2. While it is certainly

possible that these ASes changed configurations and became
vulnerable in the interim between the two measurements, it is
perhaps more likely that the changes made to our methodology
for Round2 allowed us to reach ASes that we could not reach
using Round1’s methodology.
Interestingly, only considering the 10,764 ASes present in
Round2 but not present in Round1, only 2,351 (22%) lacked
DSAV. One possible cause for this is that these ASes had
a relatively small presence in the DITL dataset, meaning
we targeted fewer addresses—potential resolvers—from them.
The average number of addresses targeted in Round2 for
ASes that were also in Round1 is 338, the median 7. By
contrast, the average number for the new ASes is 32 and the
median 2. The lower number of targeted addresses reduces the
opportunity we have to observe a lack of DSAV.
A. Autonomous System Degree
In an attempt to shed some more light on why fewer
of the “new” ASes lacked DSAV, we hypothesized that
autonomous systems with a higher degree, i.e., ASes with
more network neighbors, would be more likely to lack DSAV.
Given that the new networks had a smaller presence in the
DITL, it is conceivable that they represent less-connected
ASes and—according to our hypothesis—could be expected
to have greater DSAV deployment. To explore this hypothesis,
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using RIPEstat’s API3 , we determined the number of unique
neighbors for each autonomous system. Given that the API
supports historical lookups, we were able to obtain current data
for both measurements. We found valid neighbor counts for
all but 2% of the autonomous systems. We divided the ASes
into groups based on number of neighbors, then determined
the proportions of ASes in each group with DSAV present
or lacking. The results are shown in Figure 1a. Indeed, there
appears to be a correlation with degree and lack of DSAV.
For Round1, on the low extreme, 41% of the networks
with only one neighbor lacked DSAV. On the other extreme,
81% of the networks with ten or more neighbors lacked
DSAV. This pattern holds for Round2: 35% and 73% of the
one-neighbor and ten-plus-neighbor networks lacked DSAV,
respectively. Formally, we model the relationship between
number of neighbors and DSAV using logistic regression and
find that the relationship is significant at 𝑝 < 2𝑒 − 16, for both
rounds. For every unit increase in number of neighbors, the log
odds of lacking DSAV increases by 0.02 (Round1) and 0.01
(Round2). Note that this model assumes that the relationship
between the number of neighbors and the log odds is linear.
With regard to the “new” ASes—those present in Round2
but not in Round1—the average number of neighbors is
roughly three times smaller than that of the ASes present in
both data sets (5 vs 15), though the median is the same for
both groups (2). This shift in distribution likely contributes
to the greater deployment of DSAV in this group; however,
this explanation is ultimately incomplete, as this new group
experiences improved rates across the board, with only 19%
of the one-neighbor ASes lacking DSAV.

As discussed in section II-A, there is no one-size-fits-all DSAV
solution. Of particular relevance for complex ASes, ACLs are
difficult to maintain at-scale and strict uRPF cannot be used
in the case of asymmetric routing. Thus, complex autonomous
systems are left with few options for blocking spoofed traffic,
possibly explaining the correlation we observe in the data.
As such, the development of spoofing prevention techniques
suitable for complex ASes—such as EFP-uRPF, incidentally
standardized between our two measurements—is valuable.
C. Spoofed Source Effectiveness
We now consider the effectiveness of the various sources
that were used, in terms of eliciting DNS activity of their
target. All numbers are presented as a fraction of the total
reachable targets.
We first analyze the overall fraction of spoofed sources that
reached their targets. For Round1, nearly half of all reachable
target IP addresses (collectively IPv4 and IPv6) only acted on
one or two sources. The median number of spoofed sources
with which queries reached IPv4 and IPv6 destinations was
3 and 2, respectively. However, 16% of IPv4 destinations and
9% of IPv6 destinations were reachable using over 50 spoofed
sources.
For Round2, 70% of the reachable targets were only
reached by one or two sources. The median number of spoofed
sources with which queries reached IPv4 and IPv6 destinations
was 2 and 1, respectively. However, 24% of IPv4 and 4% of
IPv6 addresses were reachable using over half of the spoofed
sources.
Next we analyze the effectiveness of the different categories
of spoofed sources (see section IV-A2), in terms of DSAV
detection. For both measurements, spoofed sources from every
category reached at least one IP target. The breakdown of
target IP addresses and ASNs reachable by spoofed source
category for both measurements is shown in Table II, under
the headings “Category-Inclusive.”
For Round1 IPv4, same-asn and same-prefix sources were
the most prevalent, reaching 78% and 63% of all IPv4 targets
that received spoofed-source queries. Dst-as-src was surprisingly effective, reaching 17% of the reachable targets. Private
addresses also had a presence, reaching 3.4% of the targets.
Even the loopback address reached one target. For Round2
IPv4, the performance of each category is comparable, with
just one exception: the percentage of reachable targets that
responded to the same-asn address is lower—57%. This is
likely due to the decrease in number of same-asn addresses
generated (97 vs 20).
As for Round1 IPv6, Same-prefix and Destination-assource were the two most effective categories, reaching 84%
and 70% of addresses, respectively. Same-ASN addresses still
had a significant presence, reaching 45% of addresses. For
Round2, Destination-as-source was by far the most effective
category, reaching 96% of all IPv6 addresses. The SameASN and Same-prefix addresses did not perform well—relative
to Round1—only reaching 5% and 12% of the addresses,
respectively. This can actually be attributed to skew from a
large autonomous system with over 200K reachable IPv6 addresses, 86% of all reachable. 98% of the IPv6 addresses that

B. Number of Announced Prefixes
We repeat the analysis of section VI-A, this time looking at
the number of prefixes announced by each autonomous system,
determining the number of prefixes announced per AS using
data published by CAIDA [32]. This analysis is shown in
Figure 1b. The number of prefixes announced also correlates
with a lack of DSAV. Once again comparing the extremes,
for Round1, 32% of the ASes with only 1 or 2 prefixes lack
DSAV, as compared to 83% of the ASes with more than 21
prefixes. Similarly, for Round2, 27% and 79% lack DSAV.
Using logistic regression to model the relationship between
number of announced prefixes and DSAV, we find that for
both rounds, the relationship is significant at 𝑝 < 2𝑒 − 16.
For every unit increase in number of neighbors, the log odds
of lacking DSAV increases by 0.02 (for both rounds). The
ASes from Round2 that were not in Round1 also announced
fewer prefixes, likely contributing to the low percentage of
“new” ASes lacking DSAV. The average number of prefixes
announced by these is 5 and the median 2, as compared to 19
and 4 announced by the ASes present in both measurements.
Both autonomous system degree and number of announced
prefixes can be interpreted as measures of autonomous system
complexity. Given that both of these factors correlate with
a lack of DSAV, the data support the notion that the more
complex the network, the more difficult it is to deploy DSAV.
3 https://stat.ripe.net/docs/data

api#asn-neighbours
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Source Class
Same ASN
Same Prefix
Dst-as-Src
Private/ULA
Loopback
Source Class
Same ASN
Same Prefix
Dst-as-Src
Private/ULA
Loopback

Category-Inclusive (one or more)
IPv4 Addrs
IPv6 Addrs
ASes
405,018 (78%)
22,073 (45%)
25,781 (97%)
327,000 (63%)
40,986 (84%)
24,390 (91%)
89,281 (17%)
34,311 (70%)
13,652 (51%)
17,762 (3.4%)
2,098 (4.3%)
3,507 (13%)
1 (0.0%)
106 (0.2%)
27 (0.1%)
Category-Exclusive (only)
IPv4 Addrs
IPv6 Addrs
ASes
172,372 (33%)
2,410 (4.9%)
1,939 (7.3%)
90,366 (17%)
3,972 (8.1%)
390 (1.5%)
13,384 (2.6%)
4,869 (9.9%)
380 (1.4%)
2,508 (0.5%)
229 (0.5%)
129 (0.5%)
0 (0.0%)
22 (0.0%)
4 (0.0%)

resulted in reaching a target that would not otherwise have
been reached, even considering all other categories combined.
Thus, if we had excluded any category of spoofed addresses
from our experiment, our total number of reachable targets
would have been lower—both by IP address and ASN. This is
shown in Table II, under the headings “Category-Exclusive.”
Notably, had we limited our spoofed sources to addresses
within the same IPv4 /24 (or IPv6 /64) as the target, with
a source address distinct from the destination address, for
Round1, we would not have discovered 36% of reachable
IPv4 addresses, 15% of the IPv6 addresses, or 9.2% of reachable ASes. For Round2, we would not have reached 31%
of the reachable IPv4 addresses, 88% of the IPv6 addresses,
or 6% of the ASes. While the query with spoofed loopback
source was handled by relatively few targets, several IPv6
addresses and ASes would not have resulted in hits without
our inclusion of this source category.

(a) Round1 data.
Source Class
Same ASN
Same Prefix
Dst-as-Src
Private/ULA
Doc.
Loopback
Source Class
Same ASN
Same Prefix
Dst-as-Src
Private/ULA
Doc.
Loopback

Category-Inclusive (one or more)
IPv4 Addrs
IPv6 Addrs
ASes
246,672 (57%)
13,387 (5.1%)
22,396 (85%)
298,500 (68%)
30,853 (12%)
24,574 (94%)
76,412 (18%)
251,126 (96%)
12,778 (49%)
9,619 (2.2%)
1,795 (0.7%)
2,619 (10%)
12,344 (2.8%)
1,617 (0.6%)
2,089 (8.0%)
0 (0.0%)
71 (0.0%)
18 (0.1%)
Category-Exclusive (only)
IPv4 Addrs
IPv6 Addrs
ASes
116,815 (27%)
1,947 (0.7%)
1,136 (4.3%)
159,101 (36%)
4,069 (1.6%)
2,369 (9.0%)
12,075 (2.8%)
227,214 (87%)
242 (0.9%)
1,509 (0.3%)
242 (0.1%)
72 (0.3%)
4,466 (1.0%)
274 (0.1%)
55 (0.2%)
0 (0.0%)
22 (0.0%)
3 (0.0%)

VII. N OTIFICATION C AMPAIGN
A. Design
1) To Addresses: The first challenge with a large-scale
vulnerability notification campaign is finding the correct points
of contact for 27K networks. We initially attempted to find
POCs using a bulk Whois data download using the service
provided by ARIN [39]. However, using this data, we were
only able to find points of contact for 9,779 ASes (37%).
Even after supplementing the ARIN data with RIPEstat’s
Whois API, we were only able to find points of contact for
15,749 ASes (59%). Eventually, we turned to the WhoisXML
API4 , a commercial service that aggregates network contact
information. There is precedent for using their API [22], [25],
[26]. Using this API, we were able to find contact information
for 21,224 ASes (80%). Considering ARIN’s, RIPE’s, and
WhoisXML’s data jointly, we found contact information for
23,227 networks (87%). We were able to find contact info for
an additional 1,038 networks (3.8%) by looking at the SOA
records of the resolvers we queried.
Unfortunately, the Whois XML API doesn’t actually give
results at the autonomous system level. What it does provide
is contact information for blocks of IP addresses which are in
the autonomous system. Unfortunately, because these points
of contact are associated with blocks of IP addresses, not the
autonomous system itself, we cannot guarantee that each email
will reach an admin associated with the AS; in the worst case,
the admin represents a sub-organization within the AS that
cannot speak or act for the AS, nor be trusted with sensitive
information pertaining to the AS as a whole. To mitigate this
limitation, we selected up to 5 points of contact for each
organization. This increased the chance that our notification
would reach the correct point of contact and decreased the
chance that the notification would be left exclusively with a
party that should not have received it. As far as we are aware,
sending emails to multiple points of contact simultaneously
has not been explored in prior work.
We first selected addresses from the WhoisXML API data,
selecting in the following order of preference: technical, abuse,

(b) Round2 data.

TABLE II: The number of IP addresses or ASes for which
at least one spoofed-source reached its target (“CategoryInclusive”) or for which a spoofed-source category was the
only one to reached its target (“Category-Exclusive”). Percentages represent the fraction of reachable targets.
accepted Destination-as-source but didn’t accept the Sameprefix or Same-ASN addresses were from this autonomous
system. Excluding all addresses from this AS, 35% of the
responsive IPv6 targets were reached by the the Same-ASN
addresses, 80% by the Same-prefix query, and 74% by the
Destination-as-source query—findings more in line with the
Round1 results. Again, this finding highlights that results at
the IP-level can be volatile, as DSAV is configured at the
autonomous-system-level.
That said, some DSAV can be performed at the IP-level—
for example, should the Destination-as-source query not be
blocked at the network border, it could still be blocked at the
destination machine. It is notable that the percentage of targetreaching queries that used Destination-as-source was much
higher for IPv6 targets (70% and 96%) than that for IPv4
hosts (17% and 18%). We observed in our lab testing that
modern Linux kernels drop destination-as-source packets that
use IPv4, but IPv6 destination-as-source packets are sent to
user space. Thus, if the fraction of reachable Linux targets is
equal between the IPv6 and IPv4 realms, we would expect the
percentage of IPv6 destination-as-source hits to be higher.
Each category of spoofed source independently contributed
to the overall effectiveness of our experiment. Every category

4 https://www.whoisxmlapi.com/
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admin, organization, and maintainer. We then supplemented
this data with the database downloaded from ARIN and
RIPEstat’s Whois API, selecting addresses in the following
order of preference: tech, admin, and NOC. Finally, as a last
resort, for any ASes with no POCs identified thus far, we
performed SOA lookups on the domain names of a sample of
the responsive resolvers from each AS. Note that we explicitly
excluded dns@cloudflare.com, as it was a very common result
of the SOA lookups, likely from resolvers that were outsourced
to CloudFlare.
After completing this process, we performed one final step
to curate the data. We noticed that many different autonomous
systems had points of contact in common. While this is reasonable, there are extreme cases of it. For example, the process
described above would have resulted in helpdesk@apnic.net
receiving over 1,000 emails from us. Thus, we excluded any
addresses that would have received over 4 emails from us.
Unfortunately, we did not notice this issue until we had already
sent some emails, though we corrected the issue quickly. This
resulted in 3 separate addresses receiving 13 emails from us,
which again, is unfortunate, though we did not receive any
complaints from those addresses. In total, we excluded 881
addresses and prevented the above mentioned addresses from
receiving further emails from us.
In summary, we emailed 57,339 different addresses. 89%
were found through the WhoisXML API, 1% through ARIN’s
database, 8% through RIPE’s API, and 2% through SOA
lookups. Each autonomous system received on average 3
emails from us.
2) From Addresses: A unique From address was used for
each point of contact. We did this in order to collect data for a
different study relating to email security (e.g., SPF [40]). The
From addresses followed the following template:

c) Level of detail: Past work indicates that detailed
notifications might be more effective than terse messages [24],
though the authors note that the difference was not significant.
A more recent study found no significant effect from how the
message is framed (e.g., a focus on the effect on end users vs a
technical focus) [27]. Thus, once again there is no compelling
evidence to dictate what level of detail to include. We elected
to include the following in our emails:
•
•
•
•
•

A basic description of our methodology;
Basic examples of how the vulnerability could be exploited;
The specific number of resolvers within their AS that we
were able to reach;
A very high-level description of how to fix the issue;
The specific number of resolvers we found that lacked
source port randomization (if applicable).

We split our notifications by address family. Thus, if we
were able to reach both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses for a given
autonomous system, we sent two separate sets of emails to that
autonomous system. The subject lines of the emails followed
the form, “IPv[4,6] Spoofing Vulnerability AS[asn].”
d) Inclusion of external report: We included a link to
a custom report, specific to each autonomous system, that
included the following:
•
•
•
•

•

DSAV Project <dsav-info@[uid].report.[date].dsav-mail.dns-lab.org>

A link to a frequently asked questions page
An option to run a quick re-test
A more detailed description of our methodology
The specific IP addresses that we were able to reach
within their AS, as well as anything we were able
to infer about them (operating system and source port
randomization)
The spoofed source addresses that were able to reach each
IP address

An example report is included in Appendix B.
Notably, we added the FAQ page, the self-test option, and
the specific5 spoofed sources after sending the emails. Ideally,
we would have had these included in the reports from the
beginning; however, we severely underestimated the level of
response we would receive. As such, we did not anticipate the
need for these features and adding them to the reports was the
only way of addressing the responses to the emails in a timely
manner.
In a prior study which similarly included an optional, detailed report, only 15-26% of the reports were requested [26].
Though we knew we would likely face similar rates, we had
significantly more information than we could possibly convey
in an email, especially for the larger autonomous systems.
Thus, we did our best to balance what we could fit into the
email proper and what needed to be relegated to the report.
The self-test option triggered a rerun of the portion of the
experiment pertaining to a given autonomous system, though
only a subset of the queries were re-sent. This allowed network
operators to gain immediate feedback on whether or not any
actions they had taken had corrected the issue and to observe

Though we had some concern that the seemingly autogenerated From address might be off-putting to the recipients,
prior work has shown that the email address of the notification
sender has no effect on patching rates [21]. Additionally,
each email included dsav-info@byu.edu as a Reply-To
header, clearly identifying our institution. We received no
comments on the abnormal From address.
3) Content: The full body of the emails we sent is included
in Appendix A. We discuss here several of the decisions we
made that resulted in the final design.
a) HTML vs plain-text: Prior work [26] found no significant difference in remediation rates between plain-text and
HTML emails, including both HTML emails with and without
external images. Thus, with no compelling evidence dictating
which to use, we elected to use HTML-formatted emails. This
allowed us to include an external image to track which emails
were opened. However, we did include a plain-text version for
email clients that don’t load HTML.
b) Language: Prior work has established that translating
the notification out of English at best has no effect and
is possibly detrimental [24], [27]. Thus, we sent all emails
in English, regardless of the apparent country of the email
domain.

5 Initially, the reports only included the general categories that were successful, e.g., “Same ASN,” “Same prefix”, etc.
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# of emails

PoC source

Interaction

Category
All vulnerable
No contact found
Email sent
Email delivered
Email opened
Report opened
Self-test ran
PoCs found via
WhoisXML
PoCs found via
RIPE or ARIN
PoCs found via
both RIPE/ARIN
and WhoisXML
PoCs found via
SOA records
0 emails delivered
1 email delivered
2 emails delivered
3 emails delivered
4 emails delivered
5+ emails delivered

Total
26,695
2,430
24,265
20,156
12,633
7,437
832
19,605

ASes
Patched
3,784 (14.2%)
372 (15.3%)
3,412 (14.1%)
2,783 (13.8%)
1,791 (14.2%)
1,165 (15.7%)
259 (31.1%)
2,643 (13.5%)

Vulnerable
21,727 (81.4%)
1,683 (69.3%)
20,044 (82.6%)
16,775 (83.2%)
10,529 (83.3%)
6,125 (82.4%)
564 (67.8%)
16,496 (84.1%)

2,003

400 (20.0%)

1,453 (72.5%)

1,603

260 (16.2%)

1,317 (82.2%)

1,054

109 (10.3%)

778 (73.8%)

2,430
6,775
5,735
3,495
3,345
4,915

372 (15.3%)
1,147 (16.9%)
910 (15.9%)
518 (14.8%)
441 (13.2%)
396 (8.1%)

1,683
5,240
4,630
2,887
2,842
4,445

source used to find the points of contact (“PoC source”), and
the number of emails received by the ASes (“# of emails”).
First, looking at the level of interaction with the notifications, all groups had comparable patching rates—between 14
and 16%, with the exception of those that ran the self-test.
31% of those that ran the self-test patched. In an attempt to
find a precise answer regarding the effect of the notification
emails, we perform a statistical analysis of the data using
a logistic regression model. For this model, we separated
individual ASes into disjoint sets, based on the most advanced
interaction they had with the email. For example, if for a given
AS, an email was sent, received, and opened, for the purposes
of this test, we only classified them as “Email opened.” The
results confirm our prior observations: there was little change
in the odds of patching for any category—aside from those
who ran the self-test tool. Those that ran the self-test tool were
between 140% and 200% more likely to have deployed DSAV
for Round2. Note that this does not imply that the inclusion
of a self-test tool improves patching rates—as we did not
design the notification campaign as a controlled experiment,
we cannot make any definitive conclusions here.
We next consider the role the source of point of contact
info plays in the notification efficacy. For this analysis, we
only consider the emails that were successfully delivered,
discounting the emails that were rejected. Interestingly, ASes
that we emailed using contacts found exclusively via the
WhoisXML API had a lower patching rate—13.5%—than
those we contacted using info obtained from ARIN and
RIPE—20.0%. While again, we cannot say conclusively why
this is, it is possibly due to the fact that the WhoisXML
does not provide true AS-level contacts, only the contact info
associated with the blocks of IP addresses registered to the
autonomous system.
We similarly consider the effect of the number of emails
received had on patching rates—once again, only considering
emails that were accepted for delivery. As can be in Table III
under “# of emails,” the patching rate for ASes for which no
emails were delivered is comparable to the overall patching
rate. The group with the highest patching rate were ASes that
had exactly one email accepted for delivery. Interestingly, the
patching rates appears to correlate negatively with the number
of emails delivered. There are two possible explanations for
this, the first being that the increased volume of emails led the
recipients to dismiss our notifications as spam. Alternatively,
as the number of emails we sent per AS was directly related
to the number of contacts that were available, the ASes
that received more emails likely represent more complex
autonomous systems—which, as shown in sections VI-A and
VI-B, are more likely to lack DSAV. Regardless of the reason,
it appears like increasing the contacts emailed per autonomous
system is an ineffective method of spurring remediation.
2) Email Responses: The volume of responses to our notifications far exceeded our expectations. In total, we received
1,719 responses to our emails (not counting bounce reports).
We worked as fast as we could to respond to these, even
developing a frequently asked questions page, a self-test tool,
and a more detailed report in order to address the needs many
of the responders had in common. We had these new tools

(69.3%)
(77.3%)
(80.7%)
(82.6%)
(85.0%)
(90.4%)

TABLE III: The autonomous systems found to be vulnerable
in Round1, broken down by various categories. For each
category, the state of the ASes in Round2 is shown (i.e.,
patched or vulnerable). The percentages in each row are based
off the the “Total” column. The percentages might not add
to 100% as there were some ASes present in Round1 that
were not present in Round2 which would be best classified
as “unknown,” though we do not explicitly show this category.
what the traffic looked like on their end. The test results
became available within a minute of being requested.
B. Results
1) Notification Efficacy: Of the 26,695 ASes we found
lacking DSAV, we were able to find contacts for and attempted
to email 24,265 (91%) of them. 61% of the emails we sent
were accepted for delivery and did not result in a bounce
report emailed back to us. Our results indicated that an email
was successfully delivered to at least one contact associated
with the autonomous system for 20,156 (75%) of the ASes.
Via the image embedded into the email body, we were able
to infer that at least 12,533 (47%) ASes opened the email.
Notably, it is possible to configure one’s email client to not
automatically request external resources; thus, it is possible
that some recipients opened the email without requesting the
embedded image, as evidenced by 100 ASes whose detailed
report linked in the email was opened without the embedded
image being requested. In total, the detailed reports for 7,437
(28%) ASes were opened and 832 (3%) ASes used the self-test
option we added to the reports.
In an effort to gain some insight on the effect of our
efforts, we divide the ASes we found vulnerable in Round1
into different sets based on properties such as opening the
email and opening the report, then compare the patching rates
between these groups. This can be seen in Table III. We look
at several different dimensions, such as level of interaction
with the notification (labelled “Interaction” in the table), the
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available within 3 days of sending the emails.
We conducted a qualitative analysis of the responses to our
emails by developing the following classification system. Each
email we received was classified as one of the following:
Human-Positive, Human-Neutral, Human-Negative, or Automated. Additionally, any number of the following labels could
be applied to each email, as appropriate: Request for more info,
Retest request, Have/will patch, Wrong email, Forwarded info,
Disapproval of the experiment, Disapproval of the emails, and
Other language.
To develop this classification system, two researchers independently read through the emails until we felt we had
a good sense of the underlying themes. We then met and
proposed an initial classification system. Then each researcher
independently coded a random sample of 50 emails. After
coding the sample, the researchers met and resolved any
differences in how they coded the sample. One coder then
coded the remaining emails. Anonymized examples of each
of these classes and labels are included in Appendix C.
Of the 1,719 responses we received, 1,091 (63%) were
automated. The automated emails largely consisted in notifications of ticket creation (e.g., “A support ticket has now
been opened for your request”) and changes in ticket status.
Of the 628 human responses, 142 (23%) were positive, 446
(71%) were neutral, and 40 (6%) were negative. Of the human
responses, 15 (2.4%) indicated disapproval of our research
(e.g., “with whose authority did you conduct the research
on my network?”) and 29 (4.6%) indicated disapproval of
our emails (e.g., accusations of spam). 200 (32%) of the
responders indicated that they either already had or intended
to patch the vulnerability. 120 (19%) requested a re-test of
their network (e.g., to validate a changed configuration). 256
(41%) requested more information (e.g., on our methodology,
mitigation strategies, etc.) 105 (17%) indicated that we had
reached the wrong person. 47 (7.5%) indicated that they had
forwarded the email to the appropriate contact. 256 (41%) of
the emails were in languages other than English, though all
but 6 of these were automated.

only consider the resolvers that resolved these queries directly,
rather than forwarding them to a third party, an assessment
we made by comparing the addresses embedded in the query
name against the IP address of the machines querying our
server. The source port range is a useful heuristic to identify
resolvers that are not randomizing their source ports. It also
provides characteristics that are helpful for identifying OS or
software, a phenomenon we explore in the conference version
of this work [2].
The most serious case of poor source port randomization
is no source port variance whatsoever.6 In response to our
spoofed-source follow-up queries, in Round1, 3,810 (1.3%)
resolvers issued 10 queries to our authoritative servers with no
variance in source port! These account for 1,780 (7%) of all
ASes lacking DSAV. It would be trivial to poison the cache
of these resolvers due to the combination of 1) the capability
to induce a query through spoofed-source query and 2) no
source port randomization. With a known source port, only
the query’s 16-bit transaction ID is left to guess; the search
space is reduced from 232 (4.3 billion) to 216 (65,536). More
than half of these resolvers (2,244 or 59%) are closed, meaning
that DSAV would reduce their attack potential.
The results for Round2 were very similar. 3,591 (1.3%)
resolvers had no variance of source port, representing 1,597
(6%) of the ASes lacking DSAV. 1,699 (47%) are closed,
again meaning that DSAV would reduce their threat surface.
2,094 (55%) of the addresses vulnerable in Round1 were also
present in the Round2 data. Of these, 1,923 (92%) still lacked
any form of source port randomization in Round2. Given that
these resolvers were disclosed in our email notifications, this
finding is disappointing, though perhaps unsurprising.
B. NXNS Attack
This portion of the analysis only applies to the Round2
data, as we had not implemented the test for Round1. The
number of requests made by each resolver when resolving
the NS records is shown in Figure 2. As our server returned
20 NS records, we consider any resolver that requested 20
or more records vulnerable. As we verified in a controlled
environment, any resolver running patched versions of BIND,
Unbound, Knot Resolver, or PowerDNS Recursor will request
significantly less than this. By this criteria, 399,430 (57%) resolvers were vulnerable (239,327 IPv4 addresses and 160,103
IPv6). 80% (21,106) of the reachable autonomous systems
had at least one vulnerable resolver. Oddly enough, there
are some resolvers that requested more than 40 records. The
most extreme case was a resolver that requested 80 records; it
requested an A, AAAA, A6, and ANY record for each NS record.
Resolvers such as these would have even greater amplification
potential than accounted for by the theoretical model [3].
We can observe peaks corresponding to the numbers of
queries requested by the various resolver implementations
during our controlled testing. For example, as BIND and Knot

VIII. C ASE S TUDY: DNS R ESOLVERS
While the knowledge that a network lacks DSAV is valuable in and of itself, in this section we demonstrate how
that knowledge might be used by someone with malicious
intent to survey or exploit vulnerabilities of internal systems,
specifically DNS resolvers.
A. Source Port Randomization
We begin by investigating one of the most prominent DNS
resolver vulnerabilities to date: lack of source port randomization [13], [41]. While this vulnerability was disclosed and
related patches were distributed nearly 13 years prior to the
writing of this paper, we hypothesized that there might be
some instance of it in the wild, behind closed doors.
To assess the source port randomization of the reachable
targets, we computed the range of source ports for the 10
IPv4 or IPv6 follow-up queries (see section IV-A4) observed
for each target IP address. Note that for this analysis, we

6 This analysis could be expanded to resolvers with ineffective source port
randomization rather than just resolvers with static ports, something we do
in the conference version of this paper [2]. However, we consider this out of
scope of the current work.
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that network complexity appears to correlate with a lack of
DSAV. Networks with a larger number of network neighbors
had a high rate of lack of DSAV, similar to networks with a
large number of announced prefixes.
Because of the broad impact of our findings, spreading
awareness is important, particularly in connection with the
publication of this paper. As part of our efforts to spread
awareness, we have reached out to the networks we found
to be vulnerable. Additionally, we have created a generalized
self-test tool that can be used by network operators to test their
own networks. This tool is now publicly available and can be
accessed at https://dsav-test.byu.edu/.
In this work, we used the domain name system as a
means of exploring the deployment of DSAV. However, this
is not a DNS-specific vulnerability. Exploring the potential
for spoofing-based network intrusion using other network
protocols remains a possible avenue for future work.

% of Resolvers

20
15
10
5
0

5

10

15 20 25 30 35
Records Requested

40 41+

Fig. 2: Recursive resolvers grouped by number of records
requested when resolving the NS records.
Resolver both requested 10 records, it is likely that the large
spike at 10 records consists of resolvers running either BIND
or Knot Resolver.
Using the open resolver follow-up query, we are able to
classify these resolvers as open or closed. 281,076 (70%) of
the vulnerable resolvers are correctly configured as closed
resolvers. Were the ASes of these resolvers to employ DSAV,
these ∼300K resolvers would not be able to be used as NXNSamplifiers by attackers external to their networks.

X. C ONCLUSION
In this paper we have investigated an area previously explored very little—the lack of DSAV in networks and systems.
We presented a methodology for effectively identifying networks and systems vulnerable to spoofed-source infiltration.
In December of 2019 we found that of 54K autonomous
systems, 49% lacked DSAV. After a notification campaign run
in October 2020, we repeated our measurement and found
that of 61K ASes, 44% lacked DAV. Finally, we identified
vulnerable DNS software and systems and found a significant
number of resolvers vulnerable to DNS cache poisoning and
the NXNS attack.
The findings in this paper are significant and can have real
impact on Internet security. It is our hope that the results of
this study, as well as our efforts to encourage change can make
that impact a positive one, providing a stronger defense against
spoofing, infiltration, DDoS attacks, and cache poisoning.

IX. D ISCUSSION
The findings in this paper are non-trivial. We have shown
that, in many cases, systems thought to be accessible only
by trusted parties can be reached with a minimal amount of
effort. We have also seen that it is not simply the reachability
of these systems that matters, but the fact that a potentially
malicious third party can discover their weaknesses with just
a few strategically-formed queries. Finally, we observed both
through active measurement and through anecdotal evidence—
supported by communications with DNS operators—that there
is some complacency with regard to security and maintenance
of internal systems. These messages collectively convey a message that security at network borders is—in many instances—
false, that old, vulnerable software and configurations yet have
a deployment presence in the wild, and that substantial effort
will be required to motivate the changes necessary to fix these
insecurities. Without such change, internal systems continue
to be reachable and potentially more vulnerable to various
attacks, including DNS cache poisoning (section VIII-A) and
NXNS exploitation (section VIII-B).
Our goal with the current research is not merely to identify the problems with networks and systems, but to spark
impetus for widespread change. Increased OSAV adoption
(i.e., BCP 38) is certainly part of the solution to source
address spoofing in the wild—to prevent both reflection attacks
and spoofed-source infiltration. However, OSAV requires the
participation of third party networks—those hosting the attackers, not the victims. On the other hand, potential victims of
spoofed-source network infiltration can prevent such attacks
by configuring their own systems for DSAV.
There is no one-size-fits-all solution for deploying DSAV.
The choice of specific technique for performing DSAV is very
dependent on the network configuration. Relatedly, we find
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A PPENDIX A
E MAIL T EMPLATE

the appropriate administrators notified.
Thank you,
IMAAL Research Lab, Brigham Young University

A. Plain-text Version
Below follows the plain-text version of the notifications we
sent. Items in bold inside brackets are replaced with the actual
values for a given AS. The paragraph regarding source port
randomization is omitted completely if a given AS has no such
resolvers.

[1] https://imaal.byu.edu
Why am I receiving this email? We selected up to 5 contacts
per autonomous system. [Description of how email was
found]. If you received this message in error and would
rather not receive any further communications relating to this
experiment, simply respond to this email and let us know. For
any additional questions or concerns, you may email dsavinfo@byu.edu.

Dear admin of AS[asn],
We are researchers from Brigham Young University’s Internet
Measurement and Anti-Abuse Laboratory [1]. During December 2019, we conducted a large-scale Internet measurement
experiment. The intent of this experiment was to determine the
pervasiveness of networks failing to filter spoofed incoming
traffic appearing to originate from within their own networks.
This oversight allows attackers to infiltrate the network and
impersonate internal resources. This in turn facilitates attacks
which could otherwise be prevented, such as DNS cache poisoning or the NXNS attack, a powerful new denial of service
technique. Our methodology relied on sending DNS queries
with spoofed source addresses to known DNS resolvers. The
queries were for domains under our control; as such if we
observed a corresponding query at our authoritative server, we
were able to determine that our spoofed queries successfully
infiltrated the network.

For the final paragraph, the description depends on the
source.
• WhoisXML API: “Your email was found through the
WhoisXML API. It is likely that your email was used
while registering some block of IP addresses within
AS[asn].”
• ARIN database: “Your email was found through Whois
info provided by ARIN. It is likely that your email was
used while registering AS[asn].”
• RIPE: “Your email was found through Whois info provided by RIPE. It is likely that your email was used while
registering AS[asn].”
• SOA: “Your email was found by requesting the SOA
record associated with one of the DNS resolvers which
acted on our spoofed queries.”
As a final note, though the email indicates that we would “be
sending a repeat of this message within a week,” we elected
not to do so due to the large response we received to the first
set of emails.

Unfortunately, it appears that AS[asn] is vulnerable to this
class of attack. [n] of the known resolvers within your autonomous system acted on our spoofed queries, indicating
that our spoofed queries successfully infiltrated the network.
Even if these resolvers are configured to resolve queries
from any host, this indicates a vulnerability, as the traffic
would have been blocked at the network border had DSAV
been in place. The solution–DSAV, or Destination-Side Source
Address Validation–is to simply filter out incoming traffic that
appears to have originated from within the network.
As part of our research, we identified [n] resolvers lacking
source port randomization within your autonomous system.
This is an extremely dangerous configuration as it leaves
the resolvers completely vulnerable to DNS cache poisoning
attacks.
Our work has been accepted to the Internet Measurement
Conference (IMC) 2020, which will begin near the end
of this month on October 27. While we will present our
results in-aggregate only and will not specifically mention
your autonomous system, we recommend resolving this issue soon before there is greater general awareness of the
vulnerability. If you have already resolved these issues,
you can safely ignore this message. If you would like
additional details about our findings relating to your network, please see “DSAV Report for AS[asn] (IPv[4,6])”:
https://imaal.byu.edu/dsav/report/ [anonymous-identifier].
We understand that email messages are sometimes lost or
overlooked. For that reason, we will be sending a repeat of
this message within a week, to ensure that it is received and
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B. HTML Version
Below is an anonymized example of the HTML-formatted emails that we sent.
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A PPENDIX B
R EPORT T EMPLATE
Below is an anonymized example of the reports that were linked in the emails. Clicking “Same ASN” triggers a Javascript
function that opens a dropdown listing all the “Same ASN” addresses that reached that IP address.
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A PPENDIX C
R ESPONSE C LASSIFICATION
Below are examples of actual emails that fit each class/label.
[x] indicates content that was removed for anonymity, [...]
indicates content that we truncated for brevity.
Class/label

Example

HumanPositive

Thank you for doing this research and
testing, it’s quite helpful and I hope it is
generally recognized as such

Class/label

Example

Retest
Request

Hi IMAAL team.
I’m the network engineer responsible for
ASN [x] and ASN [x]. Some weeks ago
I received a report [x] informing our network was susceptible to receiving forged
IP address from Internet with our own
address spacing, although we have BCP38
in place for every customer.
That said and understanding this might
be exploited as an attack vector, we have
worked during last days to implement
filters on our border network devices.

Best,
[x]
HumanNeutral

Good day

I’d like to ask you to run the test validation
again and if possible send me a report so
we can validate if our filtering actions are
being effective.

describe in more detail - what exactly do
you want ?
Best regards,

Thank you!

[x]
HumanNegative

[x]

Hello,

Have/Will
Patch

Please stop SPAMING us !!!!

I am network engineer for the AS defined
in the email you sent below on 10/13/20.
I am following up to inform you that we
have implemented changes to hopefully
resolve issues with this vulnerability. I do
not know if you plan to run this experiment or something similar again, but if
you do, can you please inform us if you
notice this or other vulnerabilities with
this AS.

best regards,
[x]
Automated

DSAV Project,
Thank you for contacting us. This is an
automated response confirming the receipt
of your ticket. Our team will get back to
you as soon as possible. When replying,
please make sure that the ticket ID is kept
in the subject so that we can track your
replies[...]

Request for
more Info

Thank You,
[x]

Hello,

Wrong Email

Hi,

I’ve received this message from you and I
would like to receive further information
about the vulnerability you’ve found.

Why are we receiving this report ?

I look forward hearing from you.

[x]

Our company has nothing to do with this
AS number ..

Best regards,
[x]
Disapproval
of the emails

Greetings,

Guys, at this rate, what you’re doing is
already pissing everyone off with your
constant spam. I have this now received
4 times today.

Forwarded
Info

Thanks, I will pass it on to the dns group.

Disapproval
of
the
experiment

With whose authority did you conduct the
research on my network?
[x]

Would you tone it down a bit for crying
out loud?

Other
language

at this rate, I’m short of clicking to filter
your spam out.

Dobrý den,
Prosı́m vás, nerozumı́m anglický, napište
český.

[x]

Děkujeme.
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